Peek and Rosengren (2005) suggested the mechanism of "unnatural selection,"
When borrowers become insolvent, a bank may become financially distressed.
Such a financially distressed bank has incentives to continue to lend to insolvent borrowers to conceal its predicament, while hoping that the circumstance of insolvent borrowers will improve. This type of bank lending that hopes for a revival in the credit status of borrowers is called forbearance lending, evergreening lending, or zombie lending. If many banks engage in this type of lending, the resulting misallocation of credit to unviable firms that could go bankrupt would damage the macroeconomic situation further still (Hoshi, 2006; Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap, 2008) . Hence, this practice has been considered to be the source of the prolonged economic stagnation experienced since the 1990s in Japan.
The empirical study by Peek and Rosengren (2005) is the most important and influential piece of research on the misallocation of bank credit in Japan.
1 They 1 Empirical research on forbearance lending in Japan also includes Sekine, Kobayashi, and Saita (2003) and Watanabe (2010) . Sekine, Kobayashi, and Saita (2003) used firm-level panel data from 1986 to 1999 and found that highly indebted firms belonging to nonmanufacturing industries are more likely to increase their bank borrowings for the sample period after 1993 despite their low level of profitability. Watanabe (2010) used banklevel panel data from 1995 to 2000, demonstrating that banks with large capital losses, particularly caused by the regulator's request in 1997 for the rigorous assessment of outstanding bank loans, are more likely to reallocate lending to unhealthy industries with a higher concentration of nonperforming loans. In terms of a theoretical framework, Bruche and Llobet (2014) provided a precondition for avoiding forbearance lending to low-quality specified forbearance lending in a nonlinear function and used loan-level data from 1994 to 1999. They found that Japanese banks' attempts to avoid the realization of losses on their balance sheets (so-called balance sheet cosmetics herein) induces the mechanism of "unnatural selection," in which Japanese banks with impaired capital are more likely to provide additional credit to unviable firms.
In this study, we reassess this mechanism in terms of the interaction effect in a nonlinear specification of bank lending. Thus, we rigorously demonstrate that Peek and Rosengren's (2005) estimation results imply that Japanese banks allocated lending from viable firms to unviable ones regardless of the degree of bank capitalization.
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section I discusses the potential shortcoming of Peek and Rosengren's (2005) nonlinear specification of bank lending in terms of the interaction effect, Section II reexamines the implication of their estimation results, and the final section provides our conclusions.
Appendices A and B explain how to calculate the interaction effect and its standard error for the probit model and for the random probit model, respectively.
firms. They suggested that regulators should induce banks to disclose the deterioration of their capital condition.
I. Specifying Lending to Low-quality Firms by using a Nonlinear Function
Peek and Rosengren (2005) specified forbearance lending by using a random effects probit model with an interaction term consisting of a low-capitalized bank indicator and a firm performance variable (i.e., working capital ratio or return on assets). They set random effects terms for each firm as firm unobserved components. This section briefly explains the potential shortcoming of specifying the misallocation of bank credit in such a random effects probit model with an interaction term. 
Function could be the logit or probit transformation, the logarithmic or 2 The same problem of the statistical inference of an interaction term in a nonlinear equation has also been discussed in political science (e.g., Berry, DeMeritt, and Esarey, 2010 In nonlinear equation (1), we can express the marginal effect of ( = 1 or 2) on the conditional expected value of as follows:
Then, we can write the cross-partial derivative, or the so-called "interaction effect," in the following equation:
3 To clarify the issue of the nonlinear specifications of bank lending, we assume that 1 and 2 are continuous variables. We discuss below the case where one of these two variables is an indicator variable, which is the case where Peek and Rosengren (2005) specified forbearance lending by using a probit specification.
Note that even if the coefficient of the interaction term, β 12 , is zero, the expression above for the interaction effect, A potential shortcoming of the approach of Peek and Rosengren (2005) and FROA , −1 , had significantly negative ones.
More importantly, they showed that the coefficients of the interaction terms, β 12 , were estimated to be significantly negative, thereby arguing that lowcapitalized banks were more likely to lend credit to low-quality firms; in other words, forbearance lending by low-capitalized banks to low-quality firms prevailed during the late 1990s in Japan. However, as discussed above, the negative values of the coefficients of the interaction terms do not necessarily ensure the existence of forbearance lending in terms of the interaction effects,
Rather, negative estimates of the interaction effects are necessary for the existence of forbearance lending to low-quality firms by lowcapitalized banks, who have window-dressing motives to avoid the realization of losses on their balance sheets. In the next section, we thus critically reassess this mechanism of unnatural selection by reporting the estimated marginal effects and interaction effects obtained with the same probit specification as that in Peek and Rosengren (2005) .
II. Critical Evaluation of the Mechanism of Unnatural Selection
Peek and Rosengren (2005) adopted a random effects probit model to specify bank lending. The difficulty in estimating the interaction effect,
, in a specific nonlinear model with unobserved heterogeneity, including the random effects probit model, involves analytically expressing the cross-partial derivative incorporating the fixed or random effects terms. Peek and Rosengren (2005) did not address this problem. In a nonlinear specification of bank lending, without obtaining firm 's random effects , we cannot compute the conditional probability of = 1 (i.e., LOAN , , = 1) and thus cannot estimate the interaction effect. 4 To estimate the interaction effect, we thus compute three types of conditional probabilities Pr( = 1| 1 , 2 , 3 , ), each of which has different assumptions about the firm random effects, , as follows:
A1. a prediction conditional on the firm random effects that are set to zeros,
A2. a prediction conditional on the empirical Bayes means of the firm random
A3. an unconditional prediction with respect to the firm random effects 4 Another practical issue to overcome when estimating the interaction effect is that we cannot simply use the commands equipped in standard econometric software such as LIMDEP and STATA. Accordingly, we calculated the marginal effect and standard error of the interaction effect by analytically expressing the interaction effect in this nonlinear model. We develop our analytical expression of the interaction effect and its standard error for the probit models with and without the random effects terms in Appendices A and B, respectively.
~(0,
2 ), which is computed by integrating a conditional prediction with respect to the firm random effects over their support; that is,
, where ( | 2 ) indicates the (0, 2 ) density function.
As discussed above, Φ(•) denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Further, 1 is the low-capitalized bank indicator, REQ2 , −1 , and 2 is firm performance measured by using the working capital ratio, FWORKCAP , −1 , or return on assets, FROA , −1 . Once we find the conditional probability by using one of the approaches A1-A3 above, we can obtain the interaction effect, expressed in equation (3), in the probit specification proposed by Peek and Rosengren (2005) as follows:
where (•) = Φ′(•) is the probability density function of the standard normal distribution.
Equation (4) Let us express the former marginal effect evaluated at a hypothetical value of firm performance, 2 = 2 , as ME , , (REQ2 , −1 = 1, 2 = 2 ) and the latter marginal effect as ME , , (REQ2 , −1 = 0, 2 = 2 ). Then, we obtain a consistent estimator for the average interaction effect evaluated at a hypothetical value of firm performance (hereafter, AIE( 2 = 2 )) as the sample mean of the interaction effect (4):
where denotes the number of observations (bank-firm relationships). 6 We calculate the standard errors of the average marginal effects by using the delta method. For the details of the calculation, see Appendices A and B.
To reexamine the implication of Peek and Rosengren's (2005) estimation results with the average marginal effects, we start by replicating the estimation results from their dataset of AER Final Data.txt, which is available online at the journal website. The analysis of the average marginal effects presented below is based on the replication of the "Full sample" results reported in Table 5 of Peek and Rosengren (2005) . The sample period runs from 1994 to 1999, during which Japanese banks faced increasing pressure to maintain regulatory capital requirements under the Basel I framework. Figures 1 and 2 respectively report the estimated interaction effects and marginal effects obtained by using the firm performance variables, FWORKCAP , −1 and FROA , −1 . In each figure, the left-hand side panels show the estimated interaction effects, AIE( 2 = 2 ), while the right-hand side panels show the estimated marginal effects for low-and non-low-capitalized banks, AME(REQ2 , −1 = 1, 2 = 2 ) and AME(REQ2 , −1 = 0, 2 = 2 ). Figures A1 to A3 are obtained by using approaches A1 to A3 to compute the conditional probability in the random effects probit specification, respectively. In each figure, the interaction effect and marginal effect are estimated at each hypothetical value of firm performance, 2 = 2 , whose range corresponds to the sample range from -120 to 80 for the working capital ratio in Figure 1 and from -25 to 25 for return on assets in Figure 2 .
The shaded areas of Figures 1 and 2 also report the histograms of the two firm
variables to allow us to analyze the allocation of bank credit in association with 8 Our random effects probit regression includes all the other control variables and reproduces the same estimation results for these as in Peek and Rosengren's (2005) regression. For the estimation results of the other control variables, see Table 5 in Peek and Rosengren (2005) . banks were more likely to increase loans to unviable firms than were non-lowcapitalized banks in the study period, as suggested by Peek and Rosengren (2005) , but also that low-capitalized banks were more likely to decrease loans to viable firms than non-low-capitalized banks were (or leave them unchanged). Rather,
given that most firms borrowing capital performed well in the late 1990s, the negative values of the interaction effects imply that the misallocation of credit from viable firms to unviable ones prevailed because of low-capitalized banks' motivation to pursue balance sheet cosmetics.
9
More importantly, Figures 1 and 2 show that the marginal effects for low-and non-low-capitalized banks, AME(REQ2 , −1 = 1, 2 = 2 )and AME(REQ2 , −1 = 0, 2 = 2 ), have significantly negative estimates. 10 This finding clearly indicates that the misallocation of bank credit from viable firms to unviable ones prevailed in the Japanese banking sector in the late 1990s; in other words, Japanese banks provided more credit to relatively unviable firms, while decreasing credit to viable ones (or keeping it unchanged) regardless of the degree of bank capitalization.
This lending behavior by capitalized banks is not consistent with the balance sheet cosmetics hypothesis.
III. Conclusion
The mechanism of unnatural selection suggested by Peek and Rosengren 9 Sasaki (2011) found that lending to more troubled industries with more nonperforming loans in the 1990s was less sensitive to a bank's capital adequacy ratio than lending to less troubled industries with fewer nonperforming loans. Given this finding, she pointed out that to calculate the risk-weighted assets, Basel I equally weighed all bank loans to firms, regardless of whether they are good borrowers; accordingly, low-capitalized Japanese banks decreased (increased) credit to viable (unviable) firms to maintain adequate capital ratios by avoiding the realization of bankruptcy and nonperforming loans under the Basel I framework. 10 Although we defined the low-capitalized bank indicator, REQ2 , −1 , by setting the threshold value of bank capital buffers above the minimum requirement to various values less than two percentage points, we confirm that the average marginal effects for both low-and non-low-capitalized banks have significantly negative estimates.
(2005) assumes that forbearance lending by low-capitalized banks to low-quality borrowers prevailed during the late 1990s in Japan, particularly driven by banks' motivation to pursue balance sheet cosmetics. In this study, we reevaluated this mechanism by focusing on the interaction effect instead of the coefficient parameter of the interaction term. More concretely, we discussed a potential shortcoming of specifying bank lending by using nonlinear functions, demonstrating that their estimation results, which are based on the random effects probit model, imply that Japanese banks allocated lending from viable firms to unviable ones in the late 1990s regardless of the degree of bank capitalization, although low-capitalized banks were still more likely to do so than non-lowcapitalized banks.
Our finding does not counter the finding of Peek and Rosengren (2005) in that we rigorously show that the bank's balance sheet cosmetics hold for forbearance lending by low-capitalized banks; rather, we complement it in that we also rigorously demonstrate that the misallocation of bank credit from viable firms to unviable ones prevailed in the Japanese banking system in the late 1990s. Other hypotheses to explain why Japanese banks emphasized relationships with relatively low-quality firms were explored by Nakashima and Takahashi (2016) Jikoshihonhiritsu no 
